Care is a situation-driven polysemantic term. Acclimatizing to different contexts, like a shape-shifter, it interacts with the corporeal world in diverse ways. Although the type of care required varies with the context, the need for care remains constant. In this interview with Professor Maurice Hamington, conducted via a chain of emails in April 2024, we discuss this variety of philosophical understandings of care. Maurice Hamington, philosopher and feminist ethicist, is a professor at Portland State University. He has written and edited fifteen books, numerous book chapters, and research articles, which has contributed to consolidating “care” as a field of study. We also briefly discuss his latest book, Revolutionary Care: Commitment and Ethos (2024). More so, this interview covers a wide range of different contexts for performing and thinking care, such as altruism, feminism, religion, and posthumanism.
Pragya Dev & Binod Mishra: Care has been tethered to health (health care) in its rudimentary but widespread understanding. How can we overcome this limited understanding?
Maurice Harrington: Care is a ubiquitous term that is employed in a variety of ways. Indeed, care is most closely associated with medical treatment. Depending upon the international context, “care” is interpreted differently. For example, Italian theorists[1] tell me that “care” is understood as the effort toward “cure” in Italian contexts. However, whatever the name given to care, including compassion, tenderness, tending to, meeting needs, and the like, care is essential to human survival and flourishing. Newborn babies require care to survive, and of course, those ill and hurt need care, but the truth is that we all need care all the time. As human beings, we desire care and to have people care for us. Still, we also want to care for others, and this desire contributes to our motivation to start families, have companion animals, volunteer, and have friends.
Part of the goals of philosophy is to have people reflect deeply on their lives—live the “examined life,” as the Ancient Greeks would say. So, to answer your question, we can transcend the common understanding of care by attending to all the ways we care and are cared for in our lives. Historically, care has been undervalued, so the work of changing attitudes about care is to see how significant it is and how we need care in our lives.
Care will always be associated with health care, but it is certainly not the exclusive domain of care.
PD & BM: How do we bring care to the center without making it altruistic in nature?
MH: Altruism is a legacy of traditional Western morality. Kant, for example, emphasized the primacy of a good will. Good intentions are often associated with absolute purity. Accordingly, a moral effort that has multiple ends, sometimes including self-serving ends, is viewed as somehow tainted. This approach is indicative of a formulaic approach to morality imposed from outside individual moral agents.
I contend care is a very grounded approach to morality that derives from the reality of complex embodied beings in relationship. Although seeking the growth and flourishing of others is the fundamental morality of care, it should not come at the sacrifice of self-care. There is no need for a purity test. One can care for others and care for the self. Therefore, I do not believe care should be framed as pure altruism.
Historically, women and marginalized individuals have been asked to be caring in altruistic ways, which has resulted in expectations of selflessness. Such altruism can be very harmful to the well-being and dignity of the caregiver.
PD & BM: You have rightly pointed out that most of the marketing firms commodify care for maximizing their profits.[2] Does care foster conflict because of its affective bearing?
MH: The co-option of “care” by marketers reveals the power and need for care. They would not invoke the language of care if they did not believe it had affective power. As Joan Tronto has argued, humans are fundamentally carers. Care is a messy approach to moral life because it does not give clear answers to questions. So, yes, care does not eliminate conflict and can even foment conflict. For example, families, which are social crucibles for care, are also the sites of conflict. One reason for this is that within a caring relationship, trust and comfort allow people to discuss rather than suppress their concerns, thus revealing conflicts that might be avoided otherwise.
Indeed, care ethics is one of the few Western moral approaches that allows for a robust consideration of emotion. Thus, affective weight is always a consideration. Care can be a very laborious practice, and it also entails emotional labor. This labor can cause internal conflict as one often has to consider the emotional cost of choosing to care.
PD & BM: In your recent book Revolutionary Care: Commitment and Ethos (2024), you write: “Care is the engine of morality and the ultimate test of the ethical” (6). What are the distinctions and commonalities between morality and ethics, and how are they intricately linked to the concept of care?
MH: There is much crossover between morality and ethics. Generally, ethics plays an adjudicative role in Western philosophy. The tendency is for such ethical approaches to be systematic, universalistic, objective, and analytic. As such, care ethics appears to be a bit of a misnomer. This is why I often prefer the term “care theory.” Nevertheless, given that the field is most commonly referred to as “care ethics,” I continue to employ that nomenclature. I frame care as a moral way of being as a way of signaling care’s ontological and epistemological dimensions that go beyond ethics. The idea of a care “ethic” seems to be too small of a container for the work of care. This is one of the reasons that I am enthusiastic about the new work in care aesthetics—it suggests a more holistic approach to thinking about morality.
PD & BM: In several discussions and interviews, you identify yourself as a “feminist care ethicist” (13). Do you think that the gender of a person, in any manner, influences their decision to call themselves a feminist? Additionally, with its recent evolution, how closely intertwined do you perceive care to be with its feminist connotations?
MH: Early in my scholarly career, I described myself as “pro-feminist” because I was very concerned about not claiming a subject position that did not coincide with my experience of the world. However, after many years of engaging in feminist scholarship, I decided it was OK to claim the title of feminist. However, I recognize that I live in a male body, and I was socialized with masculine cues. So, I accept any criticism of my privilege and failures to be consistently feminist. I agree with bell hooks that feminism is for everyone and that although men benefit significantly from patriarchy, a feminist future opens up a range of human experiences, including greater permission to emote and care.
One does not have to be a feminist to care. However, I like to refer to the field as “feminist care ethics” to honor the idea that modern care theory is derived from women’s experience and theorized by feminist scholarship. So, while care does not have to be intertwined with feminism yet care ethics in its modern form is an innovation of feminism.
I should note that care has been richly developed in many non-Western cultures. So, although I refer to feminist care ethics, traditions of care far predate feminism.
PD & BM: In what ways does masculinity impact care? Conversely, how does care reframe masculinity?
MH: First, masculinity manifests itself differently across cultures and within cultures. Judith Butler describes how gender is a performance. So, we make a series of decisions about how we comport ourselves, dress, talk, and relate to one another that are indicative of a range of different gender manifestations, whether male or female.
Certain manifestations of masculinity have been described as “toxic.” This masculinity values being cold, distant, and avoids emotional engagement. Sometimes, movies lionize such portrayals of masculinity. If the world is going to be more caring, many men will have to rethink their relational comportment. This is not to say that gender is a binary or that all women demonstrate good care, but many men have adopted a masculinity that is anathema to care.
PD & BM: To what extent does observation orchestrate care?
MH: This is an interesting question. Because we are embodied beings that move and exist in the world, observation becomes an essential aspect of how we learn to care and determine the extent of our care. The field of care aesthetics makes this point by discussing the performance of care writ large. For example, one of the questions that James Thompson asks is whether the actions and practices of nurses can be described as beautiful and artful. Similarly, Christina Leroy discusses kinaesthetic empathy—feeling the experiences of other people through observing their bodies in motion.
As I discussed in my first book on care ethics, Embodied Care, the work of French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty helps us to see that as embodied beings, we are both subject and object. We control our actions because we have agency and are fully actualized subjects. However, we are also objects because we have form and shape. We can observe our own actions and assess the extent to which they are caring. Thus, observation is important to caring whether we are observing others or ourselves. Perhaps this is why so many care theorists have emphasized the role of attentiveness in caring. We have to be attentive to the one cared for, but in that process of heightened attention, we will also attend to the caring practices themselves.
PD & BM: Since care relationships align with an individual’s capacity to provide care, could it be considered a pursuit of convenience?
MH: I am unsure of the meaning of the pursuit of convenience in this context, but I will do my best. Care is a necessity. We must have it in our lives. We will seek to have experiences of care. Since we are finite physical beings, that pursuit will most frequently manifest through convenient means. For example, we tend to seek out caring relationships from those in proximity to us rather than from distant others. Care is also hard work, so sometimes people will transact for care, as in the hiring of child care. This can be described as a convenience, but for those who need to work, it is a necessity.
PD & BM: Please comment on the relationship between fear and care. What is the comprehensible psyche behind caring out of fear?
MH: For a question like this, it is important to clarify the context. Care given out of fear of punishment violates the agency of the caregiver. Care has historically not always been associated with the good. Colonizers and abusers invoke the word “care.” So, forced care is a coopted activity that lacks authenticity and may be unmotivating for the caregiver.
Another clarification is around the range of fear. A certain amount of fear is healthy. It is a survival mechanism, such as the fear of running in front of a car. However, inordinate or pervasive fear can be crippling, such as the fear for your life in a violent context. Undue fear is a signal that care is needed. This is true for both the one receiving care and the one giving care.
Care can be an antidote for fear. Someone who is food insecure and fears that they will go hungry can find solace in the care of another who provides succor. A caring environment, like one that many parents endeavor to provide for their children, can reduce their fear and anxiety of the unknown, which is part of a more fulfilling life.
PD & BM: Essentially every religion envisions and promotes a better caring world. How does religion influence care? Additionally, why, in occasional situations, does it bespeak fear and procure monetary benefits from care?
MH: As part of their moral teaching, all religions have a call to care for others. Great acts of care are done in the name of religion. Religious organizations support many great relief organizations that provide for those in need. Religious institutions have also sponsored hospitals and schools that promote care in society.
However, religious organizations are populated by fallible human beings. Sometimes, religious leaders take themselves and the ideology of their religion too seriously and place ideology above care for people. When this happens, religions can be the source of uncaring practices and policies.
You ask whether religions monetize fear. Both religious and political leaders have recognized that fear is a powerful motivator. So, some misguided religious leaders do instill fear for the financial gain of their churches and ultimately for themselves.
So, as you can see, religion is a mixed bag. One the one hand, religion is capable of being a significant force for caring practices as well as a potent source for uncaring actions.
PD & BM: One of the many diverse understandings of care incorporates entities other than humans. How can we advocate the relational facet of posthuman care?
MH: Care is a very malleable term. Care can be applied to non-human beings and objects as well. However, that does not make all care equal. Care is very contextual. However, since we are embodied beings and we begin with our own visceral experience of care, the focus tends to be on human relationships. That does not mean that there is no cross-over between domains of care. Many humans have companion animals that they care for very much. I have written about how we can learn much about care from our relationship with animals. All care involves imagination that allows us to extend our empathy to others. In regard to animals, our imagination must work harder to make a connection, and yet we do it all the time. Caring for the environment has also received significant attention from theorists. Such care engages an even greater level of imagination to extend respect and dignity to ecosystems and their constituencies. This is an area where the West can learn a great deal from indigenous cultures that have achieved a higher degree of relational equilibrium.
PD & BM: Thinking beyond the Western context, what are indigenous practices that contemplate care?
MH: I do not pretend to be an expert on indigenous cultures and practices. I don’t know if anyone can be because there are so many spread throughout the world. However, I have some superficial knowledge of some indigenous concepts that seem fruitful for care and that the industrialized world can learn from.
Often, the indigenous forms of care are more holistic and interwoven into society than the more compartmentalized understanding of care found in Western theory. For example, ubuntu philosophy found in various parts of Africa emphasizes our interconnectedness. The Cree of Canada has a concept of wahkohtowin, which means kinship of people, animals, lands, air, and water. We can even consider the Chipko movement in India and how women villagers expanded the circle of care into an environmental movement.
PD & BM: Could you elucidate on the thought process behind describing what constitutes good or effective care? Furthermore, what makes you use “good” and “effective” interchangeably in this context?
MH: I endeavored to describe good care in my most recent book to highlight the many ways care is used. Often, when writing care theory, the assumption is that care is good. However, as I mentioned earlier, care can be used in extremely harmful ways. So, I wanted to contribute language to help us distinguish between good care and poor care. However, even that distinction is fraught with nuance. Care exists on a continuum rather than in a binary (good care/bad care). In other words, there are degrees of good care.
Many care theorists are leery of defining good care because care is so contextual. For example, there are cultural differences in what constitutes care. So, I did not really define good care but described the elements of deep care that is good and effective. Those elements are humble inquiry, inclusive connection, and responsive action. Thus, I think of care ethics as a process of morality where the considerations are methodologies and skills rather than an end goal. I can never be a perfect carer, but I can always improve my caring skills. Humble inquiry describes the epistemological aspects of care. Care is always predicated on knowledge—both generalized expertise and specific knowledge of the one cared for. It’s crucial to retain humility in the learning process and not presume to know what the other needs ahead of the necessary inquiry. Inclusive connection describes the imaginative and empathetic elements of good care that should be extended beyond those whom we are close with and familiar to those whom we are less familiar with. Finally, care must be an action in the world, as it is more than a disposition. However, such actions must respond to the needs of the other and avoid stereotypes and superficiality.
I use the terms good care and effective care interchangeably because I think, generally speaking, the arbiter of the quality of care is the care receiver. For care to be good, it must be effective in the eyes of the one cared for.
PD & BM: What are your suggestions to future researchers on care?
MH: As I state on my website, https://www.mhamington.com/, the world needs more care. So, the domains for further research are quite wide. All areas of philosophy can be engaged when we think about care—ontology, epistemology, aesthetics, and, of course, ethics. As I stated, I prefer the term “care theory” because I think the field should be expansive and extend beyond merely the container of “ethics.” I am very excited about what the new generation of scholars is doing with care theory in terms of different cultural connections, identities, particularly marginalized identities, and applications of care theory to the professions of education, law, social work, business, and health care.
PD & BM: What motivated you to focus on the domain of care? How do you intend to explore the concept of care in your upcoming projects?
MH: My original interest in care was sparked by my first graduate course in feminist theory, which introduced me to the work of Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings. It was further motivated by the birth of my daughter in the early 1990s. I immediately found care to be an attractive yet undertheorized field that I wanted to be a part of.
I do not have a major book planned at the moment. I am writing a chapter about embodied care as a source of veridiction (a Foucauldian notion of truth narrative). I plan to write a chapter on care as a moral aesthetic. I will spend the month of November in Japan working with feminist care ethicists there to think about care in the Japanese context. I think it would be nice to work on an open-access introductory textbook on care ethics that can be available to all for free.
[1] For Italian care ethicist Luigina Mortari (University of Verona), the common word for care is also the word for cure in Italian. Christine Leroy, a French philosopher, also indicated that there are similar translation challenges in French.
[2] For detailed arguments, please look into Hamington, Maurice. “Socialism and Creating A Care Economy.” Revolutionary Care Commitment and Ethos, 1st ed., vol. 1, Routledge, New York, NY, 2024, pp. 132–156. & Tronto, Joan C. Caring Democracy: Markets, Equality, and Justice. New York University Press, 2013.